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Is rentier capitalism that bad? Rent, efficiency and 
inequality dynamics 
 
By Mohamed ben Ridha MABROUKa† 
 
Abstract. The current economic context shows a tendency to inequality and rather weak 
growth. Rent-seeking behavior is often blamed for that. The purpose of this paper is to 
analyze the consequences, on the accumulation trajectory, of the existence of a rent levied 
by the rich on the poor. The model is inspired by the articles Stiglitz (1969), Schilcht 
(1975) and Bourguignon (1981). In particular, convex saving is used. We seek to see to 
what extent the introduction of a rent may call into question the Pareto-superiority of 
inequality proved by Bourguignon (1981) or alter the risk of decline highlighted in 
Mabrouk (2016). Within the limits of the assumptions of the model and of the numerical 
simulations carried out, we arrive at interesting and rather unexpected observations. 
Namely, a moderate rent levied by the rich on the poor may not only allow a Pareto-
improvement of the economy and prevent the risk of decline, but also, it may unlock the 
economy from under-accumulation trap even if initial capital endowment is insufficient. 
The disadvantages of such a rent for the poor are felt only if the economy approaches or 
exceeds the golden rule where the net marginal productivity of capital is zero. 
Keywords. Inequality dynamics, Neoclassical growth, Rent, Efficiency. 
JEL. D99, E13, E21, E22, O41. 
 
1. Introduction 
he current economic context shows a tendency to an increase in the income 
of the rich to the detriment of the poor1. Jacobs (2016) and Stiglitz (2015b) 
suggest that this increase in high incomes stems from rents with no clear 
counterpart in terms of output, such as rents due to market power, cronyism, or 
position rents due to the possession of irreplaceable assets such as well-situated 
buildings2. 
This situation is not in line with the neoclassical theory of income distribution 
according to marginal productivities that predicts that every factor earns a 
competitive income according to what it adds to domestic production. Would 
deviation from that theory have a negative impact on growth and economic 
efficiency? Although in the public debate the answer to this question tends to be 
positive, it is useful to look at it in more detail at the theoretical level3. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze, within the framework of a simple 
neoclassical model, the consequences of the existence of a rent levied by the rich 
class on the competitive income of the poor class as set by the neoclassical theory 
of income distribution according to marginal productivities. This is done in a 
demonetized context, without uncertainty nor technical change, and taking into 
account the difference in saving behavior according to the level of income. The 
model is inspired by the articles Stiglitz (1969), Schilcht (1975) and Bourguignon 
(1981). The economy has two production factors: capital and labor, a production 
function with constant returns to scale, and an individual marginal propensity to 
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save increasing with income. Individuals are assumed to be similar in all respects 
except for their membership in a given social class. This differentiates them only 
by their initial capital endowments and the rent received or paid. 
Ignoring differences between individuals in terms of skills, saving behaviors 
and random events that could differentiate them, aims to focus on the impersonal 
aspect of inequalities dynamics. In this context, it appears that the assumption of 
a marginal propensity to save increasing with income (i.e. a convex saving 
function) is crucial for the emergence of distinct and stable social classes. Indeed, 
Stiglitz (1969) showed that a linear saving function leads to the convergence of 
classes. Even when considering a pseudo-convex saving function, where the 
marginal propensity to save passes discontinuously from 0 to a constant positive 
value when income increases, Stiglitz (2015a) shows that the only stable 
configuration remains a single social class. By extending the work of Stiglitz 
(1969) to the case of convex savings, Schilcht (1975) showed that one can get 
two stable classes. Bourguignon (1981) then showed that the equilibrium with 
two classes Pareto-dominates the egalitarian equilibrium. 
Unlike Stiglitz (2015a) which focuses on inequality in itself and its causes, it 
should be noted that the present work is in the spirit of Bourguignon (1981), 
where the main concern is efficiency rather than inequality, and where egalitarian 
equilibrium is a poverty-trap from which one must escape. In this context, one 
seeks to see to what extent the introduction of a rent levied by the rich class on 
the income of the poor class may call into question the Pareto-superiority of the 
unequal configuration proved by Bourguignon (1981). We also want to see to 
what extent the introduction of such a rent alters the risk of decline highlighted in 
Mabrouk (2016). 
After introducing the model and the assumptions in section 2, sections 3, 4 
and 5 attempt to prepare the mathematical groundwork of the general model in 
order to show how rent modifies the curves that govern equilibrium under the 
conditions imposed in section 2. From section 6 on, since general calculations 
lack exploitable explicit formulas, we take a numerical example to follow the 
evolution of equilibria according to rent levels. This makes it possible to arrive at 
interesting, rather unexpected observations on the way in which rent influences 
the economic trajectory and the type of equilibrium. It should be noted that, 
although the parameters of the simulations are chosen at reasonable levels, these 
simulations do not pretend to have an empirical value. 
Sections 7 and 8 study the equilibrium response to the variation of two 
essential parameters: the proportion of rich and the social propensity to save. 
Charts are often used to base arguments. Charts without numerical values 
represent only the shapes of the curves and are drawn by hand. Those with 
numerical values are computed and plotted by computer. 
 
2. Model and assumptions 
The same assumption and notations as Mabrouk (2016) are used, except some 
specified below. 
Individual savings are assumed to depend on income according to the function 
𝑆(𝑦) where 𝑦 is the income of the individual concerned.  𝑆 is convex, increasing, 
twice differentiable on ]0, +∞[ and checks 𝑆 0 = 0,  𝑆 ′ 0 > 0  and 
lim𝑦→∞ 𝑆
′ 𝑦 = 1. Denote 𝑇 the inverse function of 𝑆. We have 𝑇 ′ > 1, 𝑇 ′′ < 0 
and lim𝑥→∞ 𝑇
′ 𝑥 = 1. The per capita production function is 𝑓(𝑘) where 𝑘 is the 
average capital per capita. 𝑓  is increasing, concave, twice differentiable on 
]0, +∞[ and checks 𝑓 0 = 0. The capital undergoes depreciation at a rate 𝛿 per 
unit of time and capital. 𝑘∗ is the per capita capital of the golden-rule defined by 
𝑓 ′ 𝑘∗ = 𝛿. 
The society is composed of two classes: the poor, in proportion 𝑎1 and the rich 
in proportion 𝑎2 = 1 − 𝑎1. We assume 𝑎2 < 𝑎1. 
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The following two conditions guarantee that we do not deviate too much from 
the case where the saving function is linear and where there exists a unique stable 
egalitarian equilibrium with non-zero production: 
 
Condition 1 : 𝑓 ′ 0 > 𝛿𝑇 ′ 0  
Condition 2 : There is a unique 𝑘  such that 𝑓 ′ 𝑘  − 𝛿𝑇 ′ 𝛿𝑘  = 0 
 
These conditions reduce the generality of this paper, but they allow to lighten 
the analysis while giving an idea of what can happen when the saving function is 
convex. 
Proposition 3 shows that conditions 1 and 2 imply that the equation 𝑓 𝑘 −
𝛿𝑇 𝛿𝑘 = 0 has a unique solution 𝑘0 > 0. This value is in fact the capital of the 
egalitarian equilibrium of the economy under consideration. 
Like in Bourguignon (1981), assume that: 
 
𝑘0 < 𝑘
∗ (1) 
 
The economic interpretation of assumption (1) is that the poor class does not 
generate enough savings to achieve maximum efficiency of the economy. 
Instead of the usual neoclassical assumption that labor and capital are paid 
according to their respective marginal productivities, it is assumed that the 
wealthy class gains a rent 𝜇 in addition to its competitive income. The rent 𝜇 is 
levied by the rich class on the competitive income of the poor class. 
By normalizing the size of the population to 1, per capita income in the rich 
class is: 
𝑓 𝑘 − 𝑘𝑓 ′ 𝑘 + 𝑐2𝑓
′ 𝑘 +
𝜇
𝑎2
 
 
Per capita income in the poor class is: 
 
𝑓 𝑘 − 𝑘𝑓 ′ 𝑘 + 𝑐1𝑓
′ 𝑘 −
𝜇
𝑎1
 
where 𝑐1 , 𝑐2 are respectively per capita capital in the poor class and per capita 
capital in the rich class. 
The dynamics of the economy are then characterized by the following 
differential system: 
 
𝑐 1 = 𝑆  𝑓 𝑘 +  𝑐1 − 𝑘 𝑓
′ 𝑘 −
𝜇
𝑎1
 − 𝛿𝑐1 
𝑐 2 = 𝑆  𝑓 𝑘 +  𝑐2 − 𝑘 𝑓
′ 𝑘 −
𝜇
𝑎2
 − 𝛿𝑐2 
𝑘 = 𝑎1𝑐1 + 𝑎2𝑐2 
 
By using 𝑇  the inverse function of 𝑆 , the equilibrium must satisfy the 
following system: 
 
𝑆  𝑓 𝑘 +  𝑐1 − 𝑘 𝑓
′ 𝑘 −
𝜇
𝑎1
 = 𝑇(𝛿𝑐1) 
 
𝑆  𝑓 𝑘 +  𝑐2 − 𝑘 𝑓
′ 𝑘 −
𝜇
𝑎2
 = 𝑇(𝛿𝑐2) 
(2) 
𝑘 = 𝑎1𝑐1 + 𝑎2𝑐2  
 
Denote (𝐸1)  and (𝐸2)  the locus of the points in the space (𝑘, 𝑐)  defined 
respectively by the first and second equations of the system (2). 
In the following, the curves (𝐸1) and (𝐸2) are constructed with the help of 
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graphic arguments. 
 
3. The relationship between 𝒌, 𝒄𝟏 and 𝒄𝟐 at equilibrium 
3.1. Plotting the curve (𝐸2) 
By deriving the two equations of (𝐸1) and (𝐸2) with respect to 𝑘, we obtain 
an expression which gives the derivative of 𝑐 with respect to 𝑘 on (𝐸1) or (𝐸2): 
 
𝑑𝑐
𝑑𝑘
 𝑓 ′ 𝑘 − 𝛿𝑇 ′(𝛿𝑐) = 𝑓 ′′  𝑘 (𝑘 − 𝑐) 
(3) 
 
Denote (𝐶) the locus of the points in the plane (𝑘, 𝑐) checking: 
 
𝛿𝑇 ′ 𝛿𝑐 − 𝑓 ′ 𝑘 = 0 
 
As explained in Bourguignon (1981), (𝐶) is increasing, lies in the half-plane 
(𝑘 < 𝑘∗) and admits the straight line (𝑘 = 𝑘∗) as a vertical asymptote. 
 
Proposition 3: There is a unique 𝑘0 > 0 such that 𝑓 𝑘0 − 𝛿𝑇 𝛿𝑘0 = 0 and 
we have  𝑘 < 𝑘0 and 𝑓
′ 𝑘0 − 𝛿𝑇
′ 𝛿𝑘0 < 0. 
Proof: Define the function 𝜓 𝑘 = 𝑓 𝑘 − 𝑇 𝛿𝑘 . We have 𝜓 0 = 0  and 
𝜓′(𝑘) = 𝑓 ′(𝑘) − 𝛿𝑇′ 𝛿𝑘 . By condition 1, 𝜓′(0) > 0 . Moreover, since 
𝑓 ′ =  𝑘∗ = 𝛿 , there is 𝛿 ′ < 𝛿  such that for 𝑘  sufficiently large, we have 
𝑓 ′ 𝑘 < 𝛿 ′ . Thus, when tends towards +∞  we have 𝜓′ 𝑘 < 𝛿 ′ − 𝛿𝑇 𝛿𝑘 →
𝛿 ′ − 𝛿 < 0. Taking account of conditions 1 and 2 and since 𝜓′  is continuous, we 
deduce that  𝜓′  is positive on  0, 𝑘  , zero at 𝑘  and negative on  𝑘 , +∞ . Thus  𝜓′  
is increasing on  0, 𝑘   and decreasing on  𝑘 , +∞ . The properties concerning 𝑘0 
arise therefrom. QED 
As stated above, 𝑘0 is the equilibrium reached with a single social class, i.e. 
the egalitarian equilibrium. By virtue of the inequality 𝑓 ′ 𝑘0 − 𝛿𝑇
′ 𝛿𝑘0 < 0, 
the egalitarian equilibrium 𝑘0 is stable. 
It follows that the solution𝑘2   of the equation 𝜓 𝑘 = −
𝜇
𝑎2
 (for 𝜇 > 0) is 
unique and satisfies 𝑘0 < 𝑘2 and 𝑓
′ 𝑘2 − 𝛿𝑇
′ 𝛿𝑘2 < 0. 
 
 
Figure 1. 
 
The shape of 𝜓  (figure 1) indicates that the expression 𝑓 ′ 𝑘 − 𝛿𝑇 ′(𝛿𝑐) 
evaluated on the line (𝑘 = 𝑐) in the plane (𝑘, 𝑐) is negative to the right of 𝑘  and 
positive to the left (see figures 2 and 3). Therefore, in the plane (𝑘, 𝑐), the point 
(𝑘2, 𝑘2) lies in the area of the plane where 𝑓
′ 𝑘 − 𝛿𝑇 ′ 𝛿𝑐 < 0. By (3), (𝐸2) 
crosses the line (𝑘 = 𝑐) through (𝑘2 , 𝑘2) with a horizontal tangent. In the right 
neighborhood of 𝑘2, (𝐸2) is therefore below (𝑘 = 𝑐). In the left neighborhood 
of 𝑘2, (𝐸2) lies above (𝑘 = 𝑐). Since (𝐸2) crosses the line (𝑘 = 𝑐) only in 𝑘2, 
the branch of (𝐸2) emanating from the right neighborhood of (𝑘2 , 𝑘2) always 
remains below (𝑘 = 𝑐) and is increasing. The branch of (𝐸2) which emanates 
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from the left neighborhood of (𝑘2 , 𝑘2)  always remains above (𝑘 = 𝑐)  and 
decreases until it encounters (𝐶) as the case may be. 
Proposition 4: In contrast to the curve  𝐸  in (Mabrouk 2016), the 
introduction of 𝜇 causes two cases to occur: (𝐸2) intersects the vertical (𝑘 = 𝑘
∗) 
once or does not intersect it. 
Proof: Consider the expression 𝐸 = 𝑇 𝛿𝑐 − 𝛿𝑐 −  𝑓 𝑘∗ − 𝛿𝑘∗ +
𝜇
𝑎2
 . The 
value of 𝐸  at 𝑐 = 0  is negative. The derivative of  𝐸   with respect to 𝑐  is:  
𝐸 = 𝛿 𝑇 ′ 𝛿𝑐  − 1 > 0. 𝐸 is then increasing as a function of 𝑐. Its maximum is 
max𝑐 𝐸 = lim𝑐→+∞ 𝑇 𝛿𝑐 − 𝛿𝑐 −  𝑓 𝑘
∗ − 𝛿𝑘∗ +
𝜇
𝑎2
 . Denote 𝜇0 =
𝑎2(lim𝑐→+∞ 𝑇 𝛿𝑐 − 𝛿𝑐 −  𝑓 𝑘
∗ − 𝛿𝑘∗ ) . Assumption (1) implies 𝜓 𝑘∗ <
0, i.e. 𝑓 𝑘∗ − 𝛿𝑘∗ < 0. By evaluating the expression  𝑇 𝛿𝑐 − 𝛿𝑐 −
 𝑓 𝑘∗ − 𝛿𝑘∗  at 𝑐 = 𝑘∗ , we get 𝑇 𝛿𝑘∗ − 𝑓 𝑘∗ . We thus have 
𝜇0
𝑎2
=
max𝑐 𝑇 𝛿𝑐 − 𝛿𝑐 −  𝑓 𝑘
∗ − 𝛿𝑘∗ ≥𝑇 𝛿𝑘∗ − 𝑓 𝑘∗ > 0. Thus 𝜇0 > 0. 
It follows that if 𝜇 < 𝜇0, then the expression  𝑇 𝛿𝑐 − 𝛿𝑐 −  𝑓 𝑘
∗ − 𝛿𝑘∗ +
𝜇
𝑎2
  takes the value 0 for some 𝑐∗ in  0, +∞ . Thus the curve (𝐸2) intersects the 
vertical (𝑘 = 𝑘∗) at (𝑘∗, 𝑐∗). If 𝜇 ≥ 𝜇0, then there is no 𝑐
∗ such that (𝑘∗, 𝑐∗) ∈ 
(𝐸2) QED. 
 
Case 1: 𝜇 ≥ 𝜇0 
 
Proposition 5: (𝐸2) is entirely to the right of the vertical (𝑘 = 𝑘
∗) and this 
vertical is an asymptote to (𝐸2). 
Proof: For a given 𝑘 , assume there exists 𝑐 ≥ 0  such that 𝑓 𝑘 +
 𝑐 − 𝑘 𝑓 ′ 𝑘 +
𝜇
𝑎2
= 𝑇 𝛿𝑐 . We thus have 
𝜇
𝑎2
= 𝑇 𝛿𝑐 − 𝑓 𝑘 −  𝑐 − 𝑘 𝑓 ′ 𝑘 ≥
𝜇
𝑎2
= lim𝑥→+∞ 𝑇 𝛿𝑥 − 𝛿𝑥 −  𝑓 𝑘
∗ − 𝛿𝑘∗ . Hence, 𝑇 𝛿𝑐 − 𝑐𝑓 ′ 𝑘 ≥
max𝑥 𝑇 𝛿𝑥 − 𝛿𝑥 −   𝑓 𝑘
∗ − 𝑘∗𝑓 ′ 𝑘∗  − (𝑓 𝑘 − 𝑘𝑓 ′ 𝑘 ) . If 𝑘 → 𝑘+
∗ , this 
inequality can be written 𝑇 𝛿𝑐 − 𝑐𝑓 ′ 𝑘 ≥ max𝑥 𝑇 𝛿𝑥 − 𝛿𝑥 − 𝜀, where 𝜀 is 
as small as one wants. This shows that 𝑐 tends to +∞ since the maximum of 
 𝑇 𝛿𝑥 − 𝛿𝑥  is reached when 𝑥 → +∞. Therefore the vertical (𝑘 = 𝑘∗) is an 
asymptote to (𝐸2). 
If 𝑘 → 𝑘−
∗ , then for all 𝑥 ≥ 0 we have 
𝑇 𝛿𝑐 − 𝑐𝑓 ′ 𝑘 ≥  𝑇 𝛿𝑥 − 𝛿𝑥 −   𝑓 𝑘∗ − 𝑘∗𝑓 ′ 𝑘∗  − (𝑓 𝑘 − 𝑘𝑓 ′ 𝑘 )  
Take 𝜀′ = 𝑥 − 𝑐 positive and close to 0. Then take 𝑘 as close as necessary to 
𝑘−
∗  so that the quantity   𝑓 𝑘∗ − 𝑘∗𝑓 ′ 𝑘∗  − (𝑓 𝑘 − 𝑘𝑓 ′ 𝑘 )  be negligible in 
comparison with  𝑇 𝛿𝑥 − 𝑇 𝛿𝑐  . This gives the inequality 𝛿𝑥 − 𝑐𝑓 ′ 𝑘 ≥
 𝑇 𝛿𝑥 − 𝑇 𝛿𝑐  ≥ 0. For 𝜀′  sufficiently close to 0+, the latter inequality gives 
𝛿 − 𝑓 ′ 𝑘 ≥ 0, which is impossible for 𝑘 < 𝑘∗. We deduce that the curve  𝐸2  
does not pass in the left neighborhood of  𝑘∗. Therefore, the curve  𝐸2  does not 
pass in the area  0, 𝑘∗  because, assuming the opposite and using (3), we would 
get step by step to the left neighborhood of 𝑘∗ QED. 
Remark 6: It is useful for the following to observe that since (𝐸2) does not 
intersect the area  0, 𝑘∗  when 𝜇 ≥ 𝜇0, for capital to equal 𝑘
∗ at equilibrium, it is 
necessary to have 𝜇 < 𝜇0. 
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Figure 2. 
 
Case 2: 𝜇 < 𝜇0 
 
This case is similar to the case addressed in (Bourguignon 1981). The branch 
of (𝐸2) which emanates from the left neighborhood of 𝑘2 intersects (𝐶) at a point 
denoted (𝑘𝑣2 , 𝑐𝑣2). According to (3), the tangent to (𝐸2) at point (𝑘𝑣2, 𝑐𝑣2) is 
vertical. (𝐸2) becomes increasing as soon as it passes above (𝐶) at (𝑘𝑣2 , 𝑐𝑣2). 
When 𝑘 increases from 𝑘𝑣2, this branch can not intersect again (𝐶) because it 
should do so with a vertical slope, which is not possible since (𝐶) does not have 
any vertical tangent. Therefore it remains above (𝐶) . Note that 𝛿𝑇 ′ 𝛿𝑐𝑣2 =
𝑓 ′(𝑘𝑣2) implies 𝑓
′ 𝑘𝑣2 > 𝛿. So 𝑘𝑣2 < 𝑘
∗. When 𝑘 tends to 𝑘∗ from the left, the 
branch of (𝐸2) above (𝑘 = 𝑐) admits a vertical asymptote like (𝐶). 
 
 
Figure 3. 
 
We now give some properties that help to see the changes that take place 
when 𝜇 varies. 
We have the following inequalities 𝑘 < 𝑘𝑣2 < 𝑘2 < 𝑐𝑣2 and 𝑘𝑣2 < 𝑘
∗. 
Proposition 7: lim𝜇→𝜇0− 𝑘𝑣2 = 𝑘
∗ 
Proof: Since 𝑘2 = 𝜓
−1  −
𝜇
𝑎2
 , 𝑘2 varies continuously with respect to 𝜇. We 
know that for 𝜇 = 𝜇0 , we have 𝑘𝑣2 > 𝑘
∗. Therefore, when 𝜇 → 𝜇0 −, we have 
lim𝜇→𝜇0− 𝑘𝑣2 > 𝑘
∗. 
Therefore, when 𝜇 → 𝜇0 −  , ( 𝐸2 ) is decreasing between 𝑘𝑣2  and 𝑘
∗ , so 
𝑐𝑣2 > 𝑐
∗ . It is now sufficient to see that lim𝜇→𝜇0− 𝑐
∗ = +∞  to deduce that 
lim𝜇→𝜇0− 𝑐𝑣2 = +∞, and, being on the curve (𝐶), to deduce that lim𝜇→𝜇0− 𝑘𝑣2 =
𝑘∗. Indeed, 𝜇 → 𝜇0 − can be written as: 
 
𝜇
𝑎2
=  𝑇 𝛿𝑐∗ − 𝛿𝑐∗ −  𝑓 𝑘∗ − 𝛿𝑘∗ ≥
𝜇0
𝑎2
= lim
𝑐→+∞
 𝑇 𝛿𝑐 − 𝛿𝑐 −  𝑓 𝑘∗ − 𝛿𝑘∗  
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which entails lim𝜇→𝜇0− 𝑐
∗ = +∞ QED. 
 
Proposition 8: 𝑘𝑣2 is increasing as a function of 𝜇. 
Proof: Differentiate 𝑓 𝑘𝑣2 +  𝑐𝑣2 − 𝑘𝑣2 𝑓
′ 𝑘𝑣2 +
𝜇
𝑎2
= 𝑇(𝛿𝑐𝑣2)  with 
respect to 𝜇 along the curve (𝐶). We get: 𝑘′𝑣2 =
1
𝑎2 𝑘𝑣2−𝑐𝑣2 𝑓 ′′ (𝑘𝑣2)
> 0 QED. 
Proposition 9: 𝑘2 is increasing as a function of 𝜇 and lim𝜇→+∞ 𝑘2 = +∞ 
Proof: The function 𝑓(𝑘) has an asymptotic direction with a slope strictly less 
than 𝛿  and the function 𝑇(𝛿𝑘)  has an asymptotic direction with slope 𝛿 . 
Therefore lim𝑘→+∞ 𝜓 𝑘 = 𝑓 𝑘 − 𝑇 𝛿𝑘 = −∞ . Equation 𝜓(𝑘2) = −
𝜇
𝑎2
 
implies lim𝜇→+∞𝑘2 = +∞. By differentiating the expression 𝜓(𝑘2) = −
𝜇
𝑎2
 with 
respect to 𝜇, we get: 𝜓′(𝑘2)𝑘2𝜇
′ = −
1
𝑎2
. But 𝜓′(𝑘2) < 0. So 𝑘2𝜇
′ > 0 QED. 
 
It is useful for the following to see the solutions of the second equation of (2) 
in another way. Denote by 𝑋2(𝑐)  the expression 𝑓 𝑘 +  𝑐 − 𝑘 𝑓
′ 𝑘 +
𝜇
𝑎2
, 
considering  𝑘  as a parameter and 𝑐  as a variable; and denote by 𝑌(𝑐)  the 
expression 𝑇(𝛿𝑐). The function 𝑇 is concave and its derivative satisfies 𝑇 ′ > 1. 
Therefore the function 𝑌 is concave and its derivative satisfies 𝑌′ > 𝛿. 
We are now in the plane  𝑐, 𝑋2 . In the case 𝜇 < 𝜇0, 𝑋2 and 𝑌 are tangent at 
the point 𝑐𝑣2 for 𝑘 = 𝑘𝑣2. If 𝑘 increases, according to figure 3, we obtain two 
intersections 𝑐𝑠2 and 𝑐𝑖2 so long as the asymptotic slope of 𝑌 , which is 𝛿, is less 
than the slope of 𝑋2, which is 𝑓
′(𝑘), i.e. as long as 𝑘 < 𝑘∗. As soon as 𝑘 exceeds 
𝑘∗, the line 𝑋2 flips as shown in figure 4. The point 𝑐𝑠2 is rejected at infinity and 
the intersection becomes only 𝑐𝑖2. 
 
 
Figure 4. 
 
If 𝜇 ≥ 𝜇0 and if 𝑘 ≤ 𝑘
∗, there is no intersection between 𝑌 and 𝑋2. If 𝑘 > 𝑘
∗, 
the intersection is limited to a single point. 
 
3.2. Plotting the curve (𝐸1)  
Figure 1 shows that under the assumption: 
 
𝜇 < 𝜇1 = 𝑎1𝜓 𝑘   (4) 
 
equation 𝜓 𝑘 =
𝜇
𝑎1
 has two solutions, the largest of which, denoted 𝑘1 , is 
greater than 𝑘 . 
We shall limit ourselves to the cases where condition 4 is satisfied.4 
We are interested only in the solution of the first equation of system (2) which 
is greater than 𝑘 . Indeed, (𝐸2) lies entirely on the right of 𝑘  and therefore there 
can not be a pair (𝑐1 , 𝑐2) that verifies the first two equations of (2) if 𝑘 ≤ 𝑘 . 
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To the right of 𝑘 , the pair (𝑘1 , 𝑘1) is solution of the first equation of (2). The 
curve (𝐸1) is constructed in the plane (k,c) starting from the point (𝑘1 , 𝑘1) in the 
same way as (𝐸2). 
Denote 𝑋1(𝑐) the expression 𝑓 𝑘 +  𝑐 − 𝑘 𝑓
′ 𝑘 −
𝜇
𝑎1
. The representation of 
𝑋1(𝑐) is added to figure 4 by observing that the two straight lines 𝑋1(𝑐) and 𝑋2(𝑐) 
are parallel and that 𝑋1 0 < 𝑋1(0). 
 
 
Figure 5. 
 
Therefore, as long as 𝑋1 0 > 0 and 𝑋2 intersects 𝑌 at two points, 𝑋1 intersects 𝑌 
at two non-zero points 𝑐𝑖1 and 𝑐𝑠1 such that 𝑐𝑖1 < 𝑐𝑖2 and 𝑐𝑠1 > 𝑐𝑠2. In the plane 
(𝑘, 𝑐), the upper branch of (𝐸1) will be above the upper branch of (𝐸2) and the 
lower branch of (𝐸1) will lie below the lower branch of (𝐸2). Condition 𝑋1 0 >
0 amounts to 𝑓 𝑘 − 𝑘𝑓 ′ 𝑘 −
𝜇
𝑎1
> 0. Denote by 𝜑 𝑘 = 𝑓 𝑘 − 𝑘𝑓 ′ 𝑘 .  𝜑 is 
increasing on  0, +∞  and 𝜑 0 = 0 (because the concavity of 𝑓 and 𝑓 0 = 0 
gives 𝑘𝑓 ′ 𝑘 < 𝑓 𝑘 , hence lim𝑘→0 𝑘𝑓
′ 𝑘 = 0). 
Condition 𝑋1 0 > 0 is equivalent to: 𝜑 𝑘 >
𝜇
𝑎1
 . 
In order to confirm the construction of the curve (𝐸1), carried out similarly to 
(𝐸2), the following two properties are proved: 
Proposition 10: Condition 𝑋1 0 > 0 is satisfied as long as 𝑘 > 𝑘  . 
Proof: For 𝑘 > 𝑘  we have 𝜓′ 𝑘 < 0 . Thus 𝑓 ′ 𝑘 < 𝛿𝑇 ′ 𝛿𝑘 . Moreover, by 
concavity of 𝑇 and 𝑇 0 = 0, the function 𝑇 𝛿𝑘 − 𝛿𝑘𝑇 ′(𝛿𝑘) is increasing in 𝑘 
and is zero for 𝑘 = 0  .Thus 𝑇 𝛿𝑘 − 𝛿𝑘𝑇 ′ 𝛿𝑘 > 0  for 𝑘 > 0 . To sum up: 
𝑘𝑓 ′ 𝑘 < 𝛿𝑘𝑇 ′ 𝛿𝑘 < 𝑇(𝛿𝑘) . This gives 𝜓 𝑘 = 𝑓 𝑘 − 𝑇 𝛿𝑘 < 𝑓 𝑘 −
𝑘𝑓 ′ 𝑘 = 𝜑 𝑘  for  𝑘 > 𝑘 . For 𝑘 ∈  𝑘 , 𝑘1 ,  we then get 𝜑 𝑘 > 𝜓 𝑘 ≥
𝜓 𝑘1 =
𝜇
𝑎1
 . And for 𝑘 > 𝑘1 , we get 𝜑 𝑘 > 𝜑 𝑘1 ≥ 𝜓 𝑘1 =
𝜇
𝑎1
 . We have 
proven that if 𝑘 > 𝑘  then 𝜑 𝑘 >
𝜇
𝑎1
 QED. 
 
Proposition 11: The first equation of (2) does not admit a solution at 𝑘 = 𝑘   (a 
fortiori the second equation - see figure 5). 
Proof: Suppose there is 𝑐1 such that 𝑓 𝑘  +  𝑐1 − 𝑘  𝑓
′ 𝑘  −
𝜇
𝑎1
= 𝑇 𝛿𝑐1 . 
Subtract 𝑇 𝛿𝑘   from the two sides of the latter equation. It gives: 
 
 𝑓 𝑘  − 𝑇 𝛿𝑘  −
𝜇
𝑎1
 +  𝑐1 − 𝑘  𝑓
′ 𝑘  = 𝑇 𝛿𝑐1 − 𝑇 𝛿𝑘   
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But  𝑓 𝑘  − 𝑇 𝛿𝑘  −
𝜇
𝑎1
 > 0. Thus  𝑐1 − 𝑘  𝑓
′ 𝑘  < 𝑇 𝛿𝑐1 −
𝑇 𝛿𝑘  . Replace 𝑓 ′ 𝑘   by 𝛿𝑇′ 𝛿𝑘  . It gives:   𝑐1 − 𝑘  𝛿𝑇′ 𝛿𝑘  < 𝑇 𝛿𝑐1 −
𝑇 𝛿𝑘  . The latter inequality is impossible since 𝑇 𝛿𝑘  is concave QED. 
Thus, by decreasing 𝑘 towards 𝑘  from 𝑘1, the intersection between the line 𝑋1 
and 𝑌 passes from 2 points to 0 point, knowing that the abscissas of the points of 
intersection, when they exist, are in  0, +∞ . Thus 𝑋1 "detaches" from 𝑌 before 𝑘 
reaches 𝑘 . By continuity, this necessarily occurs when 𝑋1 and 𝑌 become tangent 
for some value of 𝑘 denoted 𝑘𝑣1. 
We thus have 𝑘 < 𝑘𝑣1 < 𝑘1 < 𝑐𝑣1. 
Figure 1 shows that lim𝜇→𝜇1 𝑘1 = 𝑘
 . We deduce lim𝜇→𝜇1 𝑘𝑣1 = 𝑘
 . Therefore, 
𝑐𝑣1 being the image of 𝑘𝑣1 on the curve (𝐶), we also have lim𝜇→𝜇1 𝑐𝑣1 = 𝑘
  . 
Since 𝜓  is decreasing on  𝑘, + ∞  and 𝜓 𝑘1 =
𝜇
𝑎1
> 0 = 𝜓 𝑘0 , we have 
𝑘1 < 𝑘0 < 𝑘
∗. This allows to construct the curve (𝐸1) starting from the point 𝑘1 
as we have done for (𝐸2) when 𝜇 < 𝜇0 . 
We easily establish the following formulas which show that 𝑘𝑣1 and 𝑘1 are 
decreasing as functions of 𝜇 : 
 
𝑘𝑣1
′ = −
1
𝑎1 𝑘𝑣1 − 𝑐𝑣1 𝑓 ′′ (𝑘𝑣1)
< 0 
𝑘1 =
1
𝑎1𝜓′ 𝑘1 
< 0 
 
Figure 6 gives the shapes of the curves (𝐸1) and (𝐸2) for 𝜇 < 𝜇0 and 𝜇 ≥ 𝜇0 : 
 
 
Figure 6. 
 
4. As a first approach: the case where 𝝁 is close to 0 
From now on we add the assumption: 𝑓 3 times differentiable on   0, +∞  and 
𝑓 ′′′ > 0. This assumption is verified by the standard production functions. For 𝜇 
sufficiently small, 𝑘𝑣2(𝜇)  is close to 𝑘𝑣2(0)  and 𝑘1(𝜇)  is close to 𝑘1(0) 
Moreover, 𝑘𝑣2 0 = 𝑘𝑣1 0 < 𝑘1(0) . So we have 𝑘𝑣2 𝜇 < 𝑘1(𝜇) . The 
following shape is obtained: 
Turkish Economic Review 
TER, 5(2), M.b.R. Mabrouk,  p.107-135. 
116 
 
Figure 7. 
 
For 𝑘 ∈  𝑘1, 𝑘2  define the function 𝐴𝑖(𝑘) by the equality 𝑘 = 𝐴𝑖 𝑘 𝑐𝑖2 𝑘 +
(1 − 𝐴𝑖 𝑘 )𝑐𝑖1 𝑘 . 
𝐴𝑖(𝑘) is continuous. It is positive on  𝑘1, 𝑘2 , zero at 𝑘1 and it takes the value 
1 at 𝑘2. From now on, it is assumed that the system (2) is smooth enough for the 
functions 𝑐1 𝑘  and 𝑐2 𝑘  to be differentiable. 
Proposition 12: 𝐴𝑖(𝑘) is increasing on  𝑘1, 𝑘2 . 
Proof: The assumption 𝑓 ′′′ > 0  is used here. The denominator of the 
expression of 𝐴𝑖(𝑘) is decreasing on  𝑘1 , 𝑘2  since 𝑐𝑖2  is decreasing and 𝑐𝑖1   is 
increasing on this interval. Let us show that 𝑘 − 𝑐𝑖1(𝑘) is increasing as a function 
of 𝑘. This is equivalent to showing that 1 −
𝑑𝑐𝑖1
𝑑𝑘
> 0. Using equation (3), we get: 
 
 
1 −
𝑑𝑐𝑖1
𝑑𝑘
= 1 −
𝑓 ′′ 𝑘 (𝑘 − 𝑐𝑖1)
𝑓 ′ 𝑘 − 𝛿𝑇 ′(𝛿𝑐𝑖1)
 
 
 
We have to show that 
𝑓 ′′ 𝑘 (𝑘−𝑐𝑖1)
𝑓 ′ 𝑘 −𝛿𝑇 ′(𝛿𝑐𝑖1)
< 1. Observe that below the curve (𝑐) the 
quantity 𝛿𝑇 ′(𝛿𝑐𝑖1)−𝑓
′ 𝑘  is positive. We thus have to show that −𝑓 ′′ 𝑘  𝑘 −
𝑐𝑖1 < 𝛿𝑇
′(𝛿𝑐𝑖1)−𝑓
′ 𝑘 . Since 𝑐𝑖1 > 𝑘 , we have 𝜓
′ 𝑐𝑖1 < 0 , thus 𝑓
′ 𝑐𝑖1 <
𝛿𝑇 ′(𝛿𝑐𝑖1) . Therefore, we shall have attained our objective if we show that 
−𝑓 ′′ 𝑘  𝑘 − 𝑐𝑖1 < 𝑓
′ 𝑐𝑖1 − 𝑓
′ 𝑘 . This last inequality follows from the 
assumption 𝑓 ′′′ > 0 which implies that 𝑓′  is convex QED 
The properties "𝐴𝑖(𝑘) increasing on  𝑘1, 𝑘2  ", "𝐴𝑖 𝑘1 = 0" and "𝐴𝑖 𝑘2 =
1" show that for 𝑎2 ∈  0,1  there exists a unique 𝑘0′ such that 𝐴𝑖 𝑘0
′  = 𝑎2. The 
triplet (𝑘0
′ , 𝑐𝑖1(𝑘0 ′), 𝑐𝑖2(𝑘0′)) is therefore a solution of system (2). If 𝜇 → 0, then 
𝑘1 → 0 and 𝑘2 → 0. The system (2) can be linearized around 0 for 𝜇 close to 0. 
Denote: 
 
𝑘 − 𝑘0 = 𝑥 
𝑐𝑖1 − 𝑘0 = 𝑦 
𝑐𝑖2 − 𝑘0 = 𝑧 
 
The first equation of system (2) becomes 
 
𝑓 𝑘0 + 𝑥𝑓
′ 𝑘0 +  𝑦 − 𝑥 𝑓
′ 𝑘0 −
𝜇
𝑎1
≈ 𝑇 ′(𝛿𝑘0)𝛿𝑦 
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Thus 
 
𝑦 ≈
𝜇
𝑎1𝜓′(𝑘0)
 
 
Similarly, we establish the approximation 
 
𝑧 ≈ −
𝜇
𝑎2𝜓′(𝑘0)
 
 
and 
𝑥 ≈ 0 
 
Since 𝜓′ 𝑘0 < 0, we have 𝑦 < 0 and 𝑧 > 0. Average capital at equilibrium is 
almost equal to the egalitarian equilibrium capital 𝑘0. But the poor class is worse 
off and the rich class is better off. 
We are now interested in the possible equilibria on the lower branch of (𝐸1) 
and the upper branch of (𝐸2). These equilibria can be seen as the result of 
deformations following the introduction of a rent, of inegalitarian equilibria in the 
case without rent studied in Schilcht (1975), Bourguignon (1981) and Mabrouk 
(2016). 
For 𝑘 ∈  𝑘1, 𝑘
∗  define the function 𝐴𝑠(𝑘) by the equality 𝑘 = 𝐴𝑠 𝑘 𝑐𝑠2 𝑘 +
(1 − 𝐴𝑠 𝑘 )𝑐𝑖1 𝑘 . In the same way as in [Mabrouk 2016], we see that 𝐴𝑠 𝑘  is 
zero in 𝑘1 , positive on  𝑘1 , 𝑘
∗  and lim𝑘→𝑘∗ 𝐴𝑠 𝑘 = 0 . Consequently 𝐴𝑠 𝑘  
admits a maximum on  𝑘1 , 𝑘
∗ . This maximum is given by the resolution of the 
system of 6 unknowns 𝑐1 , 𝑐2 ,
𝑑𝑐1
𝑑𝑘
,
𝑑2
𝑑𝑘
, 𝑘 and 𝐴 the 6 equations given in Mabrouk 
(2016). 
However, unlike Mabrouk (2016), 𝐴 depends on 𝑎1 and 𝑎2 because the curves 
(𝐸1)  and (𝐸2)  depend on 𝑎1  and 𝑎2 . The same kind of reasoning as in 
Bourguignon (1981) shows that equilibria on the lower branch of (𝐸1) and the 
upper branch of (𝐸2) occur in peers and that the equilibrium with the highest 
value of capital is stable. If 𝜇 is close enough to 0, this equilibrium is close to the 
stable Pareto dominant equilibrium of Bourguignon (1981). Hence, it is Pareto-
superior to the egalitarian equilibrium 0. This does not fundamentally alter the 
conclusions obtained in the case without rent. 
For 𝑘 > 𝑘𝑣2, notice that 𝑐𝑠2 𝑘 > 𝑐𝑖2 𝑘  implies 𝐴𝑖 𝑘 > 𝐴𝑠 𝑘 . Figure 8 and 
figure 9 show the possible shapes for the curves 𝐴𝑖 𝑘  and 𝐴𝑠(𝑘) when 𝜇  is 
small. 
 
 
Figure 8. Pattern I 
 
In figure 8, the horizontal (𝐴 = 𝑎2) intersects 𝐴𝑖and 𝐴𝑠. As in [Bourguignon 
1981], one shows that 𝑘0′  is stable, 𝑘1  is unstable, 𝑘2  is stable and Pareto-
dominant. We call 𝑘0′ the lower stable equilibrium because 𝑐2(𝑘0′) is taken on 
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the lower branch of (𝐸2). We call 𝑘1 the unstable equilibrium and 𝑘2 the upper 
stable equilibrium because 𝑐2(𝑘2) is taken on the upper branch of (𝐸2). We are 
interested only in stable equilibria. 
In figure 9, the horizontal (𝐴 = 𝑎2) intersects 𝐴𝑖  only. There is only the lower 
stable equilibrium 𝑘0′. Therefore, even if capital per capita is high at the outset, 
the economy will decline towards 𝑘0′. The analysis is similar to the case where 
 𝑎2 > 𝐴 in Mabrouk (2016). 
 
 
Figure 9. Pattern II 
 
5. Case 𝒌𝒗𝟐 > 𝒌𝟏 
For 𝜇 ≥ 𝜇0 let’s agree to write 𝑘𝑣2 = 𝑘
∗ and  𝑐𝑣2 = +∞. The case 𝑘𝑣2 > 𝑘1 
can occur if 𝜇  increases sufficiently. Indeed, since 
𝑘𝑣2(0) < 𝑘1(0),  lim𝜇→𝜇0− 𝑘𝑣2 = 𝑘
∗ , 𝑘1 ≤ 𝑘0 < 𝑘
∗  and since 𝑘𝑣2  is increasing 
and 𝑘1 is decreasing with respect to 𝜇, there exists a unique 𝜇2 such that 𝑘𝑣2 =
𝑘1. We have 𝜇2 < 𝜇0. For 𝜇 ∈  0, 𝜇2  we have 𝑘𝑣2 < 𝑘1 and for 𝜇 > 𝜇2  we have 
𝑘𝑣2 > 𝑘1. 
𝜇2 is solution to the following system with the three unknowns 𝑘, 𝑐, 𝜇 and the 
three equations: 
 
𝑓 𝑘 − 𝑇 𝛿𝑘 =
𝜇
𝑎1
 
𝑓 𝑘 +  𝑐 − 𝑘 𝑓 ′ 𝑘 +
𝜇
𝑎2
= 𝑇 𝛿𝑐  
𝑓 ′ 𝑘 − 𝛿𝑇 ′ 𝛿𝑐 = 0 
 
If 𝜇 > 𝜇2, the minimum value of 𝐴𝑖 𝑘  is no longer 0 since the minimum 
value of 𝑘 is henceforth 𝑘𝑣2. Let 𝐴 be this minimum value 𝐴 is positive and we 
have: 
 
𝐴 = 𝐴𝑖 𝑘𝑣2 =
𝑘𝑣2 − 𝑐𝑖1(𝑘𝑣2)
𝑐𝑣2 − 𝑐𝑖1(𝑘𝑣2)
 
 
 
The domain of function 𝐴𝑠 is now  𝑘𝑣2, 𝑘
∗ . Therefore, 𝐴𝑠 no longer starts at 
the value 0 but at the value 𝐴 = 𝐴𝑖 𝑘𝑣2 . 
We no longer have the assurance that 𝐴𝑠 reaches a maximum inside  𝑘𝑣2 , 𝑘
∗  
or that the derivative of 𝐴𝑠 takes the value 0. However, we are certain that, in the 
plane (𝑘, 𝐴) the horizontal (𝐴 = 𝑎2) intersects either 𝐴𝑖  or 𝐴𝑠  or both. Here are 
the possible patterns for the intersection of (𝐴 = 𝑎2) with 𝐴𝑖  and 𝐴𝑠: 
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Figure 10. Pattern III 
 
In pattern III, the analysis does not differ from that of pattern I. 
 
 
Figure 11: Pattern IV 
 
In pattern IV, the lower stable equilibrium disappears, but not the upper stable 
equilibrium 𝑘2. 
 
Figure 12. Pattern V 
 
In pattern V, there is only equilibrium 𝑘0′. The position of this equilibrium on 𝐴𝑖 
should not suggest that the value of 𝑘0′ is small. It will be seen that 𝑘0′ reaches high 
values for 𝜇 sufficiently large. 
 
 
Figure 13. Pattern VI 
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Figure 13 represents 𝐴𝑖  when 𝜇 ≥ 𝜇0 . The curve 𝐴𝑠  disappears in this case 
because the upper branch of (𝐸2) no longer exists when 𝜇 ≥ 𝜇0. The analysis of 
the equilibrium does not differ from that of pattern V. 
Furthermore, 𝐴(𝜇) is zero for 𝜇 ∈  0, 𝜇2  and positive for 𝜇 ∈  𝜇2 , 𝜇0 . 
Functions 𝑓 and 𝑇  are supposed to be sufficiently smooth for the variables 
𝑘𝑣2 , 𝑐𝑣2 , 𝑐𝑖1(𝑘𝑣2)  to be continuous with respect to 𝜇 . Consequently, 𝐴(𝜇)  is 
continuous with respect to 𝜇 over the interval  0, 𝜇0 . It has been shown above 
that lim𝜇→𝜇0− 𝑘𝑣2 = 𝑘
∗  and lim𝜇→𝜇0− 𝑐𝑣2 = +∞ . We deduce that 
lim𝜇→𝜇0−𝐴(𝜇) = 0. For 𝜇 ≥ 𝜇0 we agree to write 𝐴 𝜇 = 0. If max𝜇 𝐴 𝜇 > 𝑎2, 
we obtain the following figure: 
 
 
Figure 14. 
 
with 𝜇3 = 𝑖𝑛𝑓 𝜇: 𝐴(𝜇) =  𝑎2  and 𝜇4 = 𝑠𝑢𝑝 𝜇: 𝐴(𝜇) =  𝑎2 . If it is not the 
case, one moves directly from pattern II to pattern V and then VI. Changing the 
saving function may yield max 𝐴 𝜇 < 𝑎2. This is discussed in section 8. 
If 𝜇 = 𝜇3  or  𝜇 = 𝜇4 , we obtain an equilibrium which lies at the point of 
coordinates (𝑘𝑣2 , 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑖)  in the plane (𝑘, 𝐴) . Thus, in the plane (𝑘, 𝑐) , the 
corresponding point (𝑘, 𝑐2) is none other than (𝑘𝑣2, 𝑐𝑣2) and lies on the curve 
(𝐶). 
Remark 13: The above entails 𝜇3 ≤ 𝜇4 < 𝜇0. 
Proposition 14: The derivative with respect to 𝜇 of the net income of the poor 
at 𝑘𝑣2 is zero for 𝜇 = 𝜇𝑖 , 𝑖 = 3 or 4. 
Proof: The point  𝑘, 𝑐2 =  𝑘𝑣2, 𝑐𝑣2  satisfies the equation of  𝐶  : 
𝛿𝑇 ′ 𝛿𝑐2 − 𝑓
′ 𝑘 = 0. If we add this equation to the 3 equations of the system 
(2), we obtain 4 equations for the four unknowns 𝑘, 𝑐1 , 𝑐2 , 𝜇𝑖 . By combining the 
first two equations of (2), we get: 
 
𝑓 𝑘 = 𝑎1𝑇 𝛿𝑐1 + 𝑎2𝑇 𝛿𝑐2  (5) 
 
For any 𝜇, the solution (𝑘, 𝑐1 , 𝑐2) of the system (2) can be considered as a 
function  𝑘(𝜇), 𝑐1(𝜇), 𝑐2(𝜇)  of 𝜇. Differentiate (5) with respect to 𝜇. It gives: 
 
𝑓′ 𝑘 𝑘𝜇 ′ = 𝛿𝑎1𝑐1𝜇
′ 𝑇′ 𝛿𝑐1 + 𝛿𝑎2𝑐2𝜇
′ 𝑇′ 𝛿𝑐2  
 
Now take again 𝜇 = 𝜇𝑖 . Replace 𝑓
′(𝑘) by its value given by the equation of 
(𝐶). It gives: 
 
𝛿𝑇′ 𝛿𝑐2 𝑘′𝜇 = 𝛿𝑎1𝑐1𝜇
′ 𝑇′ 𝛿𝑐1 + 𝛿𝑎2𝑐2𝜇
′ 𝑇′ 𝛿𝑐2  
 
Now replace 𝑘′𝜇  by 𝑎1𝑐′1𝜇 + 𝑎2𝑐′2𝜇 . It gives: 
 
𝛿𝑇′ 𝛿𝑐2  𝑎1𝑐′1𝜇 + 𝑎2𝑐′2𝜇 = 𝛿𝑎1𝑐1𝜇
′ 𝑇′ 𝛿𝑐1 + 𝛿𝑎2𝑐2𝜇
′ 𝑇′ 𝛿𝑐2  
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After rearranging: 
 
𝛿𝑎1𝑐′1𝜇𝑇′ 𝛿𝑐2 = 𝛿𝑎1𝑐1𝜇
′ 𝑇′ 𝛿𝑐1  
 
Thus 𝑐′1𝜇𝑇′ 𝛿𝑐2 = 𝑐1𝜇
′ 𝑇′ 𝛿𝑐1 . Since 𝑐1 ≠ 𝑐2 , we have necessarily 𝑐1𝜇
′ = 0. 
The income of the poor is: 𝑓 𝑘 +  𝑐1 − 𝑘 𝑓
′ 𝑘 −
𝜇
𝑎1
− 𝛿𝑐1. The first equation 
of (2) allows us to write this income as: 𝑇 𝛿𝑐1 − 𝛿𝑐1. The derivative of this 
expression with respect to 𝜇 is:  𝑇′(𝛿𝑐1) − 1 𝛿𝑐
′
1𝜇 = 0 QED. 
 
The economic interpretations of 𝜇3 , 𝜇4 and proposition 14 will be developed 
in the following sections. 
 
6. A numerical example 
6.1. General data 
We adopt the parameters used in Mabrouk (2016)5 . The numerical values are 
only intended to highlight the economic phenomena that are being analyzed. 
They are chosen at levels supposed to be reasonable. But the question of 
conformity of these numerical values with the reality of a given country is not 
considered here not to clutter up this paper. The production function is chosen in 
such a way that it gives a gross income normalized to 1 with a capital coefficient 
of 2.5 (i.e. 𝑓(2.5) ≈ 1). This makes it possible to interpret the values of the rent  
in terms of percentage of the gross income normalized to 1 considered as 
reference income. For example, 𝜇 = 1.5. 10−2 is interpreted as a rent of 1.5% of 
the reference income. 
We take 𝑓 𝑘 =
3
4
𝑘0.3. The rate of capital depreciation is 3.7%. The saving 
function is constructed to meet the conditions of section 2 and realize savings 
rates ranging from 10% to 30% depending on income levels. 
The formula chosen is: 
 
𝑆 𝑦 = 𝑏 +
1
2
 1 + 𝑐  𝑦 − 𝑎 +
1 − 𝑐
1 + 𝑐
 𝑐 ′ +  
1
2
 1 + 𝑐 (𝑦 − 𝑎) 
2
 
 
With 
 
𝑎 = 1.7105249 
𝑏 = 0.0301171 
𝑐 = 0.0677230 
𝑐′ = 0.1889504 
 
This function gives the following savings rates by income as a percentage of 
the reference income : 
 
income 10% 100% 150% 200% 
savings rate 11,54% 15,45% 20,64% 29,37% 
 
The proportion of rich is set at 𝑎2 = 3%  and the proportion of poor at 
𝑎1 = 97%. 
The following results are obtained for 𝜇1 and 𝜇2, with an error smaller than 
10−4: 
 
𝜇1 = 44.18. 10
−2 
𝜇2 = 0.37. 10
−2 
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The value 𝜇2 = 0.37. 10
−2   represents a rent of 0.37% of the reference 
income. 
The value 𝜇1 = 44.18. 10
−2  represents a rent of 44.18% of the reference 
income. 
For 𝜇0 , we have to compute lim𝑐→+ 𝑇 𝛿𝑐 − 𝛿𝑐 . It turns out that this limit is 
equal to 
 
lim
𝑦→+∞
 𝑦 − 𝑆(𝑦) = 𝑎 − 𝑏 
 
 
Thus 𝜇0 = 1.63. 10
−2. 
Finally, we verify that the assumptions of section 2 are met, in particular 
conditions 1 and 2. 
 
6.2. Description of a gradual increase in rent 
We examine what happens when 𝜇 varies from 0 to a limit value where the 
equilibrium income of the poor is less than the egalitarian income. This value of 
𝜇 will be denoted 𝜇6. 
We observe the succession of the following patterns: I, III, IV, V. 
We thus begin with a situation close to the case without rent. We obtain the 3 
equilibria: lower stable equilibrium 𝑘0′, unstable equilibrium 𝑘1 , upper stable 
equilibrium 𝑘2. As mentioned in section 4, as long as 𝜇 is small the analysis does 
not differ much from the case 𝜇 = 0 studied in Mabrouk (2016). This means that 
if the initial capital is insufficient and the propensity to save of the poor is low, 
the economy may find itself locked in the lower stable equilibrium 𝑘0′, which, as 
long as one is in pattern I, is Pareto-dominated by the upper stable equilibrium 
𝑘2. 
For example, for 𝜇 = 0.07. 10−2 , the lower stable equilibrium is: 
 𝑘0
′ , 𝑐1 , 𝑐2 = (6.52,6.51,7.01). The upper stable equilibrium is:  𝑘2 , 𝑐1 , 𝑐2 =
(11.61, ,7.15,157.67).6 
From 𝜇 = 𝜇2 = 0.37. 10
−2 , we proceed to pattern III. The lower stable 
equilibrium is then:  𝑘0
′ , 𝑐1 , 𝑐2 = (6.60,6.45,11.46) . The upper stable 
equilibrium is:  𝑘2 , 𝑐1 , 𝑐2 = (11.99,7.17,167.78) . This new upper stable 
equilibrium is better, in the Pareto sense, than the one attained with a lower rent. 
Thus, the increase of the rent levied on the income of the poor makes it possible 
to increase not only the income of the rich but also that of the poor! The 
underlying reason is that rent promotes a better accumulation that improves labor 
productivity, which, in turn, improves wages. 
If 𝜇  is still increased, it is observed that starting from 𝜇3 = 0.4. 10
−2 , we 
proceed to pattern IV where there is no longer lower stable equilibrium. The risk 
of falling into poverty7 no longer exists. 
It thus appears that an increase in rent not only improves the economy in the 
Pareto sense, but also helps to compensate for the possible lack of initial capital 
which may otherwise threaten to lock the economy in poverty. 
If we further increase 𝜇, starting from 𝜇4 we proceed to pattern V (figure 12). 
That is, in the plane (𝑘, 𝐴) the equilibrium is taken on the curve 𝐴𝑖  instead of the 
curve 𝐴𝑠. Therefore, in the plane (𝑘, 𝑐), the equilibrium value of 𝑐2 is now taken 
on the lower branch of ( 𝐸2 ). The calculation gives 𝜇4 = 1.5. 10
−2 . The 
observation shows that at 𝜇 = 𝜇4 the net income of the poor is maximum. This 
fact is confirmed by proposition 14. So to speak, 𝜇4 is the "pro-poor" capitalist 
rent. This remark is not valid for 𝜇3  because in this case the upper equilibrium is 
not realized at 𝑘𝑣2. 
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For the rich, on the other hand, their net income always increases with 𝜇 
within the limits of the interval of the study (figure 21). 
For 𝜇 = 𝜇4, the unique equilibrium is:  𝑘2 , 𝑐1 , 𝑐2 = (13.13,7.19,204.99). 
From 𝜇4  on, the analysis of the equilibrium does not change. The average 
capital at equilibrium continues to increase until exceeding the golden-rule capital 
𝑘∗. Denote by 𝜇5 the value of 𝜇 beyond which the average capital exceeds 𝑘
∗. So 
to speak, 𝜇5 is the "efficient rent". The calculation gives  𝜇5 ≈ 1.56. 10
−2. 
The observed ranking 𝜇3 ≤ 𝜇4 < 𝜇5 < 𝜇0 is in accordance with remarks 6 and 
13. The crossing of 𝜇0 = 1.63. 10
−2 does not change the equilibrium analysis 
and does not have any particular economic significance. From 𝜇6  on, the net 
equilibrium income of the poor falls below egalitarian income. The calculation 
gives 𝜇6 ≈ 16.07. 10
−2. This level is significantly higher than the pro-poor rent 
𝜇4 and the efficient rent 𝜇5. 
The following figures represent the equilibrium positions for each of the 
following cases: 0 ≤ 𝜇 < 𝜇2 , 𝜇2 ≤ 𝜇 < 𝜇3  𝜇3 ≤ 𝜇 < 𝜇4  𝜇4 ≤ 𝜇 < 𝜇0  and 
𝜇0 ≤ 𝜇 
Arrows indicate the movement of the equilibrium when 𝜇 increases: 
 
 
Figure 15. 0 ≤ 𝜇 < 𝜇2 (pattern I ) 
 
 
Figure 16. 𝜇2 ≤ 𝜇 < 𝜇3 (pattern III) 
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Figure 17. 𝜇3 ≤ 𝜇 < 𝜇4 (pattern IV) 
 
 
Figure 18. 𝜇4 ≤ 𝜇 < 𝜇0 (pattern V) 
 
Figure 19.  𝜇0 ≤ 𝜇 (pattern VI) 
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6.3. Rent and efficiency 
To what extent does rent undermine economic efficiency? Efficiency is 
conceived here as proximity to the golden rule. The issue is to examine the 
relationship between rent and the distance between the average capital at 
equilibrium and the golden-rule capital 𝑘∗. We obtain the following trends: 
 
 
Figure 20. 
 
 
Figure 21. 
 
Thus, the average capital at equilibrium increases with 𝜇. We have no general 
mathematical proof of this observation. Efficiency is maximal when the average 
capital at equilibrium reaches 𝑘∗  for 𝜇 = 𝜇5 . Beyond 𝜇5 , there is 
overaccumulation of capital. The proximity between 𝜇4 and 𝜇5 suggests that it is 
the poor who bear the cost of overaccumulation because their income begins to 
decline while the income of the rich continues to grow. We also have no general 
mathematical proof for the proximity between 𝜇4 and 𝜇5. 
The plotting of the function 𝐴(𝜇) makes it possible to display the values of 
𝜇2 , 𝜇3, and 𝜇4, as well as the areas "release from poverty", "Pareto-improvement" 
and "declining income of the poor": 
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Figure 22. 
 
6.4. Partial release from poverty 
As has been shown in Mabrouk (2016), in the case of a zero rent, if one starts 
with too high a proportion of rich, the only equilibrium is the lower stable 
equilibrium. Even if the initial capital endowment is high, the economy is caught 
in a vicious circle of deaccumulation where savings can no longer cover the 
maintenance costs of a capital stock that has become too high. This was referred 
to as "Keynesian decline" in Mabrouk (2016), because of a passage from (Keynes 
1936) describing a decline caused by the conjunction of an excess of wealth and 
inequality. In such a case, it is interesting to see what happens when adding a 
capitalist rent (i.e. rent to the benefit of the rich). 
Take 𝑎2 = 5.5%. In this case, with a zero rent, the value of 𝐴 is calculated to 
be 5.04% (by using the 6 equations given in Mabrouk (2016). The economy 
declines towards poverty since 𝑎2 > 𝐴. If 𝜇 increases, the value of 𝐴 increases. 
For 𝜇 = 0.1 . 10−2, we find 𝐴 = 5.30%. For 𝜇 = 0.2 . 10−2 we find 𝐴 = 5.58%. 
This value is greater than 𝑎2. So there is now an upper stable equilibrium for 
𝜇 = 0.2 . 10−2. All in all, with a zero rent, we start with the pattern II explained 
in the following figure; then we go to pattern I as 𝜇 increases. 
 
 
Figure 23: 0 ≤ 𝜇 < 𝜇3′ (pattern II) 
 
The value of 𝜇  which characterizes the transition from pattern II to pattern I 
realizes the tangency between the curve 𝐴𝑠(𝑘) and the straight line (𝐴 = 𝑎2). 
Let’s denote it 𝜇3′. For 𝑎2 = 5.5%, the calculation gives 𝜇3
′ = 0.17 . 10−2 and 
𝜇3 = 0.76 . 10
−2. 
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To sum up, for 0 ≤ 𝜇 < 𝜇3′ we have pattern II. Then, as 𝜇  increases, we 
return to the same evolution as for 𝑎2 = 3% : pattern I for 𝜇3′ ≤ 𝜇 < 𝜇2; pattern 
III for 𝜇2 ≤ 𝜇 < 𝜇3 ; pattern IV for 𝜇3 ≤ 𝜇 < 𝜇4 ; pattern V for 𝜇4 ≤ 𝜇 < 𝜇0 ; 
pattern VI for 𝜇0 ≤ 𝜇. 
The transition from pattern II to pattern I can be interpreted as a partial release 
from poverty. Indeed, starting from 𝜇3′ , the economy can be released from 
poverty provided that the initial capital endowment is sufficient. Whereas if the 
rent crosses the threshold 𝜇3 , the economy is totally released from poverty 
regardless of the initial capital allocation. 
 
 
Figure 24. 
 
In conclusion to this section and contrary to immediate intuition, the levying 
of a rent by the rich class can play a favorable role for the whole economy, 
including for the poor class. 
Moreover, the example studied in this subsection shows that the risk of 
Keynesian decline can be avoided by means of a rent. Indeed, the rent makes it 
possible to meet the needs for the maintenance of capital when savings without 
rent cannot any longer cover them. 
However, and more in line with immediate intuition, beyond a certain level of 
rent (𝜇4 ≈ 1.50% of reference income when 𝑎2 = 3%), the equilibrium income of 
the poor decreases with the increase of capitalist rent. 
 
7. Variation of 𝒂𝟐 𝟐 
In the case without rent, when 𝑎2 tends to 0, we have seen in Mabrouk (2016) 
that when the savings of the poor are insufficient, the economy tends towards 
maximum efficiency whatever the saving function, provided that it is convex. It 
turns out that this result does not hold in the presence of rent. For example, in the 
presence of a rent of 0.005, our calculation shows that the average capital at 
equilibrium clearly exceeds 𝑘∗ when 𝑎2 tends to 0: 
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Figure 25. 
 
We now give the evolution of the thresholds 𝜇3
′ ,𝜇3,𝜇4, 𝜇5 for 𝑎2 varying from 2% to 
8% : 
 
 
Figure 26. 
 
We read in figure 26 that for 𝑎2 > 5.04%, the economy is doomed to poverty 
as long as 𝜇 < 𝜇3
′  even if the initial capital endowment is high (Keynesian 
decline). If 𝜇  is in the interval  𝜇3′, 𝜇3 , the economy can be released from 
poverty provided that it has enough initial capital. If 𝜇 ≥ 𝜇3
′ , the economy is 
released from poverty whatever the initial capital. 
For 𝑎2 ≤ 5.04%, there is no longer any possibility of Keynesian decline. The 
economy is condemned to poverty only if the initial capital is insufficient. As 
soon as 𝜇 ≥ 𝜇3, the economy is released independently of the initial capital. 
 
In the following 3 charts, we represent the average capital at equilibrium, the 
net income of the poor at equilibrium and the net income of the rich at 
equilibrium as a function of 𝑎2, for different values of 𝜇. These charts show that 
for 𝜇 = 0.1 . 10−2 the Keynesian decline occurs for 𝑎2 between 5.5%,  and 6%. 
For 𝜇 = 0.5 . 10−2 the Keynesian decline occurs for 𝑎2  between 6.5% and 7%. 
The more one increases 𝜇, the more one increases the proportion of rich that the 
economy is able to bear without falling into decline. This suggests that rent 
makes it possible to stabilize the accumulation of capital by protecting it from the 
risk of decline that arises when the proportion of rich becomes high. 
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Figure 27. 
 
 
Figure 28. 
 
All other things being equal, the income of the rich always benefits from the 
increase of the rent which shelters it from Keynesian decline, whereas the 
outcome for the poor is more nuanced. A high value of rent reduces the income of 
the poor if the proportion of rich is not excessive. The reason is the cost of 
overaccumulation that is borne by the poor as seen in subsection 6.3. For the 
poor, if the proportion of rich is low, it is better to have a low capitalist rent. But 
if the proportion of the rich is high, it is better to accept a higher capitalist rent in 
order to rule out the risk of Keynesian decline. 
What happens now if, for each value of 𝑎2, the capitalist rent is fixed at its 
pro-poor level 𝜇4? The following 2 charts show that everyone wins: 
 
 
Figure 29. 
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Note that the value of 𝜇4 in figure 29 changes for each value of 𝑎2. 
 
8. Variation of the social propensity to save 
As in Mabrouk (2016), the saving function is modified by introducing a 
coefficient 𝛽 in the following way: 
 
𝑆𝛽 𝑦 =
1
𝛽
𝑆(𝛽𝑦) 
The variation of the coefficient 𝛽  represents the variation of the general 
willingness to save of society. If 𝛽 increases, this willingness increases and vice 
versa. For this reason, we call 𝛽 the "social propensity to save".8 
If we represent the curve 𝐴(𝜇) of figure 22 for several values of 𝛽 and with 
𝑎2 = 3%, the following figure is obtained: 
 
 
Figure 30. 
 
The two intersections of 𝐴(𝜇) with the horizontal (𝐴 = 𝑎2 = 3%) are 𝜇3 and 
𝜇4 . If 𝛽  approaches 𝛽  by lower values, 𝜇3  and 𝜇4  approach one another. If 𝛽 
exceeds 𝛽 , there is no intersection. This means that if 𝛽  exceeds 𝛽 , there is no 
longer any risk of Keynesian decline. 
We now give the evolution of the thresholds 𝜇3
′ , 𝜇3 , 𝜇4 and 𝜇5 for 𝛽  varying 
from 0.8 to 1.25 (with 𝑎2 = 3%). 
 
 
Figure 31. 
 
For 𝛽 ≥ 𝛽 , the optimal capitalist rent for the poor is 0. This means that when 
the social propensity to save is high, a rent, even small, is harmful to the poor. 
However, we can have 𝛽 ≥ 𝛽  and 𝜇5 > 0. Thus, while harmful to the poor for 
 𝛽 ≥ 𝛽 , rent can help improve economic efficiency if it remains below 𝜇5. 
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The curve 𝜇5(𝛽) intersects the x-axis at a point 𝛽 
 . Beyond 𝛽  , the economy is 
overaccumulated whatever the value of the rent. By taking a zero rent, we see that 
𝛽   is the solution of the equation 𝑆
𝛽  
 𝑓 𝑘∗  = 𝛿𝑘∗. In other words, the egalitarian 
equilibrium capital 𝑘0  𝛽 
   is equal to the golden-rule capital 𝑘∗ . It can be 
deduced that when the social propensity to save is very high, the rent no longer 
offers any social advantage. A strong social propensity to save is able to put the 
economy in the trajectory of a stable accumulation without the help of rent. The 
only effect of rent would then be to enriching the rich at the expense of the poor. 
It is only in this case that the effect of rent corresponds to immediate intuition: an 
unjust and unproductive extortion. 
We are now interested with the variation of 𝜇0 according to 𝛽. The value of 𝜇0 
as a function of 𝛽 is given by the following formula: 
 
𝜇0 = 𝑎2( lim
𝑐→∞
 𝑇𝛽 𝛿𝑐 − 𝛿𝑐 −  𝑓 𝑘
∗ − 𝛿𝑘∗ ) 
= 𝑎2  
1
𝛽
lim
𝑐→∞
 𝑇 𝛿𝑐 − 𝛿𝑐 −  𝑓 𝑘∗ − 𝛿𝑘∗   
 
For 𝛽 = 0.8 , we obtain 𝜇0 = 2.89 . 10
−2 . For 𝛽 = 1.2 , we obtain 𝜇0 =
0.79 . 10−2. It is observed that for any value of 𝛽, 𝜇0 is greater than 𝜇5. This is 
consistent with remark 6. 
The following 3 charts show the average capital at equilibrium, the net income 
of the rich at equilibrium, and the net income of the poor at equilibrium as 
functions of the social propensity to save. These charts confirm that the increase 
of rent prevents Keynesian decline and that it is always profitable to the rich, all 
other things being equal. For the poor, we see that if the social propensity to save 
is strong, a capitalist rent, however small, is unfavorable to them. But if the social 
propensity to save is low, it is profitable for them to accept a certain level of 
capitalist rent. This allows for accumulation and maintenance of capital which 
would otherwise be impossible because of the weakness of the social propensity 
to save. 
 
Figure 32. 
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Figure 33. 
 
9. Conclusion 
The following lessons can be drawn from this study: 
1- When capitalist rent is low, it can improve the poor’s income. Indeed, not 
only does it allow a Pareto-improvement of the economy, but also, it may unlock 
the economy from under-accumulation trap. If the proportion of rich is small, this 
unlocking can even occur while capital endowment is very insufficient. 
2- The level of capitalist rent that makes the situation of the poor worse than it 
would be under egalitarianism is significantly higher than that maximizing 
overall efficiency (efficient rent) or maximizing the income of the poor (pro-poor 
rent). 
3- Capitalist rent makes it possible to stabilize capitalism by avoiding the risk 
of deaccumulation caused by an insufficiency of savings to cover the 
maintenance of a too large capital (Keynesian decline). This risk, highlighted in 
Mabrouk (2016), appears particularly in the context of an increase in the 
proportion of rich. In such a case, rent-seeking behavior might be individually 
and collectively beneficial. 
4- Capitalist rent begins to be clearly harmful to the poor only if the economy 
is close to the stage of overaccumulation. In other words, as long as net 
productivity of capital is positive, moderate capitalist rent does not impoverish 
the poor. It enriches them by encouraging the accumulation of capital which 
increases wages. However, it should be kept in mind that this hold under our 
neoclassical assumption that wages remain linked to the productivity of labor. 
When the rent reaches a level such that the economy becomes overaccumulated, 
it is the poor who bear the cost of overaccumulation. 
5- A strong social propensity to save can put the economy on a good trajectory 
of accumulation without recourse to capitalist rent. For the poor, moderate 
capitalist rent makes it possible to palliate the weakness of the social propensity 
to save. But it becomes detrimental to them if the social propensity to save is 
strong. 
These lessons rely of course on the simplifying assumptions of our model: no 
money, only one good, no technical progress, no uncertainty, and most 
importantly the assumption of a rigid saving behavior not related to the position 
in the accumulation trajectory. The main difference between this assumption and 
the standard intertemporal optimization model is the persistence of a strong 
propensity to save for high incomes in periods when greater consumption would 
have been socially preferable. Nevertheless, we believe that this type of behavior, 
although rigid, is more realistic than intertemporal optimization because the latter 
does not capture the game between capitalists who, at a certain stage of 
accumulation, are under the threat of deaccumulation because of the decline in 
the productivity of capital. It is likely that this threat contributes to a high 
propensity to save at the wrong time. There is much to gain from studying this 
issue in the context of a dynamic game. 
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Notes 
 
1 See for example: (Oxfam report “Even It Up” 2014). 
2 For more precision on the meaning of the word "rent" in this context, see Stiglitz (2015b) page 7. 
3 Murphy, Shleifer, & Vishny (1993) analyzed the effect of "rent-seeking" behavior in terms of 
efficiency and economic growth. However, their approach differs from ours because, on the one 
hand, it considers rent-seeking as a productive activity in its own right, and on the other it does 
not place the question of rent in a dynamic perspective of capital accumulation. 
4 For the proposed numerical application, we will see that this condition is not limiting since the 
value of 𝜇1 is more than 44%. It goes far beyond the other critical values of 𝜇 that our analysis 
reveals. 
If 𝜇 > 𝜇1  the curve (𝐸1) would divide into two branches, one above the line (𝑘 = 𝑐) and the other 
beneath. The interesting branch is that which is below, as in the case 𝜇 ≤ 𝜇1 . We will not deal 
here with the case 𝜇 ≥ 𝜇1 
 
5 The saving function is slightly modified so as to ensure perfect equality 𝑆 0 = 0. This is because 
exact equality is required for the calculation of the positions of the curves for high values of 𝜇. 
6 The values of capital are given with an error smaller than 10−2 and the values of rents are given 
with an error smaller to 10−4. 
7 I use the terminology "poverty" to describe a state of general under-accumulation. 
8  As in Mabrouk (2016), we draw the reader’s attention to the fact that the variation of the 
coefficient 𝛽  alone can not represent all the possibilities of modifying the profile of the 
willingness to save. For example, one can conceive of an increase in the willingness to save 
among the poor and simultaneously a decrease in this willingness among the rich. Such a 
modification is not captured by the parameter 𝛽 and is not considered in the present study. 
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